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JusTICE CARTER's DISSENT IN 
HuGHES v. SuPERIOR CouRT OF 
CoNTRA CosTA CouNTY: 
HARBINGER OF THE 6os CIVIL 
RIGHTS MovEMENT AND 
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION? 
By Frederic White* 
The bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 undoubtedly was one 
of the most tumultuous events of the 20th century. It set the stage for four 
years of global warfare that resulted in the wholesale disintegration of nations 
and families, tremendous loss oflife, and worldwide economic upheaval. One 
of the obvious challenges of what eventually became known as World War II 
was the U.S. government's need to design and construct the weapons of war-
fare, as well as produce the material to fuel those weapons. Some areas of the 
country were more suited than others to provide these kinds of services. Rich-
mond, California was such a place. 
The City of Richmond, located in the East Bay, north of Berkeley and north-
east across the San Francisco bay from the city of San Francisco, already pos-
sessed twelve major shipyards, including Henry Kaiser's massive ship building 
facilities, as well as numerous oil refineries, at least two of the necessary ingredients 
for the successful waging of a fighting campaign.1 Richmond, however, lacked 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. 
1. Marilynn S. Johnson, Wartime Shipyards: The Transformation of Labor in San Fran-
cisco's East Bay, in AMERICAN LABOR IN THE ERA OF WoRLD WAR II, 89 (Sally M. Miller & 
Daniel A. Cornford eds., 1995) (hereinafter "Johnson"). 
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one important ingredient: enough labor to build the ships and work in the oil 
refineries. What to do? 
Excerpts from one book discussing the World War II era details the events 
of the day, revealing how, because of the war, the old world had become new 
for black workers lured to Richmond: 
Between 1942 and 1945, slightly more than 50,000 black people moved 
to the East Bay, fulfilling a utopian dream .... War industries, which 
dominated the landscape for those years, created an unprecedented 
demand for labor and seemed to promise a share of the California 
dream to every able-bodied worker who could make the journey. 
Thousands of blacks set out to claim what California offered. In doing 
so, they transformed the basic premises on which the prewar black 
community had existed in the East Bay. Their sheer numbers sud-
denly made black people highly visible in public places and gave them 
a dynamic presence which could not be ignored ... 
The labor recruiters who traveled to Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Mis-
sissippi, and the Carolinas were looking for workers for Kaiser's four 
gigantic shipyards in Richmond, for Marinship in Sausalito, for Moore 
in Oakland and Todd in San Francisco. The rapid growth of war in-
dustries in the Bay Area and the enormous mobilization of men [and 
women] into the Armed Forces demanded many more workers than 
the region could provide ... 
In the poverty-stricken Dustbowl states and in the rural South, the 
promise of industrial jobs in the West appeared as a ticket out of an 
endless cycle of despair, and Federal recruiters were only one part of 
the network that carried the message. Blacks already in the East Bay 
wrote letters to relatives; whole church congregations heard from one 
or two members about the opportunities. In these informal commu-
nication networks, the successes of those who had already gone were 
emphasized and stories were told about a society where blacks were much 
freerer than in the South. Recruiters urged men to come without their 
families to work "for the duration" of the war emergency .... Believing 
that freedom from southern restrictions would liberate their own re-
sourcefulness, they had no intention of relinquishing the opportuni-
ties the war placed before them .... 2 
2. Crouchett, Bunch and Winnacker, "Visions toward tomorrow: the history of the East 
Bay Afro-American community," 1852- 1977 (Northern California Center for Afro-American 
History and Life) ( 1989), pp. 45-46 (hereafter, "Visions"); see also, Johnson, pp 90-91. 
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In keeping with the old saying, "be careful what you wish for:' some south-
ern blacks, recruited to the "promised land" of northern California in search 
of a brighter future full of new jobs and broader freedoms, soon learned that 
the harsh reality of their lives in the West was far less than the expected dream. 3 
Cleophus Brown, an African American from the south who traveled to the Bay 
Area in search of work during the war, provides this account: 
Arriving in Richmond in 1942, Cleophus Brown got off the train and 
walked a block to a cafe. He was refused service. Neither Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Executive Order 8802 of June, 1941, forbidding racial dis-
crimination in all defense contracts nor the desperate need for labor 
created equal opportunity.4 
Thus, all was not as promised. Despite assurances that things would be dif-
ferent, black workers who had been arriving by the trainload-sometimes as 
many as six full trains a day5-soon found out that Jim Crow was alive and well 
in the Golden State. In many cases black workers were routinely shut out of higher 
paying, relatively safe jobs and relegated to the more dangerous ones and for 
less pay.6 Further, they were still the last to be hired and the first to be fired. 
After arriving with such hope, blacks found more and more doors shut to them 
at the docks and in the refineries, even hiring in grocery stores. Unions en-
gaged in discriminatory practices. Landlords refused to ret;~t. Restaurants, 
shops, and theaters began to segregate or refuse service altogether/ One author 
observed: 
The integration of blacks, women, and other newcomers was indeed 
a sensitive issue among white workers .... Although blacks and whites 
3. Opposed to job discrimination in industries, in 1941 long-time black activist A. Philip 
Randolph threatened to stage a massive demonstration in Washington, D.C. to protest such 
practices. As a result of Randolph's threat, President Roosevelt created the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission (FEPC). See Brown, et al., White-Washing Race: The Myth of 
a Color-Blind Society, p. 164 (University of California Press, 2003). 
4. See "Visions," supra note 1 at 46. 
5. Clifford Metz, "A City in Transition: Richmond during World War n:• an interview 
conducted with Judith K. Dunning (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 1992). 
6. "Seeing them as well-suited to arduous labor, shipyard employers concentrated black 
workers in the hull trades-hard, outdoor work on a year-round basis. By contrast, Chi-
nese-American workers were often placed in electrical work, a lighter, detail-oriented trade 
considered more suitable for them." Johnson at p. 92. Johnson notes that cultural stereo-
types were not immutable and did change somewhat based on the labor demands dictated 
by the war effort. 
7. See ''Visions:' supra note 1 at 46. 
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worked side by side, racial tensions were all-pervasive. "The slightest 
touch ... revealed the impermanence of the surface calm and the depth 
of the hatred beneath." The hostility ... was most evident among white 
Southerners and was often couched in gender terms invoking the threat 
of miscegenation. s 
Out of this background arose the case of Hughes v. Superior Court of Con-
tra Costa County,9 decided by the California Supreme Court in 1948. 
As a response to the discriminatory hiring practices of a large number of 
white-owned businesses in the 1940s, Hughes and others established a group 
called "Progressive Citizens of America" ("Progressive") in Richmond, Cali-
fornia. The Hughes case detailed the events surrounding unemployed black 
workers picketing certain "Lucky Stores;' a grocery chain with a store located 
near the Canal Housing Project in Richmond, in order to compel the store to 
hire more black clerks. In response to the picketing, lawyers for Lucky Stores 
requested a preliminary injunction against the picketing. The request for in-
junctive relief was granted by the Superior Court of Contra Costa County. The 
injunction, challenged by Hughes' attorneys as a Due Process Clause violation, 
was annulled by the intermediate appellate court,10 but reinstated on review 
by the Supreme Court of California.u Nevertheless, despite the reinstatement 
of the preliminary injunction, the picketing continued. Thereafter, Lucky Stores 
protested these actions and the picketers were adjudged in contempt of court. 
They appealed via certiorari to the California Supreme Court, seeking annul-
ment of the judgment of contempt. In a 4-2 decision, the court affirmed the 
judgment of contempt. Justice Jesse W. Carter, Golden Gate Law class of 1913, 
wrote one of the two dissents.l2 Hughes' application for a rehearing was de-
nied.13 Hughes applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, but the judgment of the California Supreme Court was affirmed. I" 
Although some of the Hughes facts were in dispute, it appears that Hughes 
and another petitioner met with some Lucky Stores officials ( 1) to protest some 
store employees' treatment of a black man named Jackson who had been ac-
cused of shoplifting, and (2) to request that Lucky Stores gradually hire black 
8. See Johnson, supra note 1 at 93. 
9. Hughes v. Super. Ct. of Contra Costa County, 32 Cal. 2d. 850 (1948). 
10. Hughes v. Superior Court in and for Contra Costa County, 186 P. 2d 756 (Cal. App. 
Dist. 1, 1947). 
11. Id. 
12. Justice Roger Traynor wrote the other dissent. 
13. Justices Carter and Traynor also voted for a rehearing. 
14. Hughes v. Super. Ct. of Cal. in and for County of Contra Costa, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). 
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clerks until the proportion of black to white clerks approximated the store's 
proportion of black to white customers. At the time of the controversy, about 
50% of the Lucky Stores Canal store customers were black. 1s Lucky Stores in-
dicated that Hughes had requested that it discharge white employees and re-
place them with black employees. Hughes denied this allegation. 
Justice Carter wrote, in part: 
DISSENT 
CARTER, J. I dissent. 
As the majority make no attempt to state the facts with particularity, 
it seems advisable to do so here. 16 The controversy centered around 
a grocery store in Richmond, Contra Costa County, one of a chain 
operated by Lucky Stores, Incorporated. Petitioners were adjudged guilty 
of contempt in that, in violation of the terms of a preliminary in-
junction, they admittedly continued to picket the store in question. 
They seek by this proceeding in certiorari to have the adjudication 
of contempt annulled, charging that their constitutional rights have 
been violated. This court has held that certiorari is the appropriate 
method to test the jurisdiction of the superior court where it is chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds [Citations omitted]. Lucky Stores 
sought an injunction in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 
naming petitioners and various organizations and individuals as de-
fendants. In its verified complaint that alleged that it was a party to 
a collective bargaining contract under a certain clerks' union where 
it had agreed to employ only members of the union unless the union 
could not meet its demands, or unless the unemployed members of 
the union were not satisfactory to it, in which event it might employ 
nonunion members, but that such nonunion employees must then join 
the union within a specified time. It was further alleged that these 
petitioners and other defendants demanded that Lucky Stores agree 
to hire Negro clerks in such proportion as the Negro customers bore 
to the white customers who patronized the store, and that plaintiff 
(Lucky Stores) discharge those employees who had participated in 
the apprehension and arrest of one Jackson who had been accused 
15. Id. at 719. 
16. Here one wonders whether Justice Carter is accusing his fellow justices of stupidity, 
duplicity, or both. 
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of shoplifting. Lucky Stores alleged these demands were refused be-
cause to comply with them would violate the contract existing be-
tween it and the union, and that no labor dispute exists between it 
and the union, and that as a result of its refusal to comply, the peti-
tioners and other defendants have picketed its store. It is contended 
that this picketing will cause irreparable injury, that it is an in-
fringement on plaintiff's right to do business, and would require it 
to violate its contract with the union. 
In response to the order to show cause w~y a preliminary injunc-
tion should not issue, petitioner Hughes filed a counter-affidavit in 
the injunction proceeding in which he sets forth the following facts 
[Hughes and others had met to protest the treatment of Jackson, to 
request that Lucky Stores gradually hire black clerks to approximate 
the number of black customers and that they did request the discharge 
of any store employees]Y 
Carter's dissent then described the picketing as peaceful and non-violent.1s 
According to Carter, "The sole question involved, at the present time, there-
fore, is the right of petitioners to picket a retail store, thereby setting forth 
their grievances and demands and publicizing the same."19 
Lucky Stores contended that the picketing was for the "attainment of an un-
lawful objective"20 that would violate the company's agreement with the Retail 
Clerks' Union. Justice Carter countered that argument with a number of United 
States Supreme Court cases holding that "picketing is identified with the freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States."2' Further, he indicated that the California Supreme Court already had 
held that "the right to picket peacefully and truthfully is one of labor's lawful 
means of advertising its grievances to the public:'22 Further, he noted that "Labor, 
always in a less advantageous bargaining position, has been held privileged to picket 
in an endeavor to put before the public its position, needs and desires."23 
17. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 858-59 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
18. The possibility of violence arising from picketing was clearly on the minds of the jus-
tices when Hughes was decided. One author's account of the violent post-World War II in-
dicates that was a tremendous amount of labor unrest during that time. See Lannon at 
104-11. 
19. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 860 (Carter, J., dissenting). 
20. [d. 
21. [d. 
22. ld. at 861. 
23. Id. 
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The majority in Hughes held the case of ]ames v. Marinship Corp.24 was con-
trolling. Marinship involved a dispute against the Marinship Corp., a Sausal-
ito-based employer who had a closed shop agreement25 with a labor union that 
would not admit black people to its membership. The question in Marinship 
was whether a closed union26 coupled with a closed shop was a legitimate ob-
jective of organized labor. The court held in the negative, noting that a union 
could not maintain a closed shop and an arbitrarily closed union at the same 
time. 
In our opinion, an arbitrarily closed or partially closed union is in-
compatible with a closed shop. Where a union has, as in this case, at-
tained a monopoly of the supply of labor by means of closed shop 
agreements and other forms of collective labor action, such a union 
occupies a quasi public position similar to that of a public service 
business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer 
claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or 
fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members 
does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental 
right to work for a living.27 
Lucky Stores contended that Hughes and his supporters were illegally pick-
eting for the purpose of setting up a closed shop and a closed union, contrary 
to the mandates of Marinship. In essence, Lucky Stores argued that if the com-
pany acceded to the picketers' demands, they would be forced to hire employees 
on the basis of race. 
Carter disagreed. In his dissent, he noted that the Retail Clerks' Union was 
not a closed union, thus distinguishing it from the closed union discussed in 
Marinship. Further, he noted that the "Petitioners are asking that Negro clerks 
be hired, and they are quite willing, and would consider their demands fully 
met if the unemployed qualified Negro clerks, presently members of the union 
24. ]ames v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721 (1944). 
25. A "closed shop" is one that only employs union members. Irving v. ]oint Dist. Coun-
cil, U.B of Carpenters, 180 F. 896 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910). 
26. A "closed union" is one which arbitrarily denies admittance to qualified workers. 
See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 864-65. The wave of newcomers to Richmond, blacks included, 
led shipyard and other unions to close their ranks, often barring newcomers altogether, or 
a hierarchy of"auxiliary unions." See Johnson, supra note 3 at 93-102; see also, Albert Lan-
non, "Fight or be slaves: the history of the Oakland-East Bay labor movement:' UNIVERSITY 
PRESS OF AMERICA, 2000, 94-96 (hereinafter, "Lannon"). 
27. See]ames v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d at 731. 
' II 
66 HARBINGER OF CML RIGHTS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION? 
involved, were hired. The statement in the majority opinion that the right to 
work for Lucky Stores would be based on race, rather than qualification for the work; 
is absolutely without foundation. Nothing could be more remote from the truth:'2B 
Carter concluded that "the situation presented here does not fall within the 
rule announced in the Marinship case. It does not fall within the definitions of 
either a closed shop, or a closed union. It must be remembered that picketing 
for either a closed shop or a closed union is not forbidden by law, but that the 
combination of the two is considered unlawful."29 
Lastly, Carter took the position that 
the end result of the majority decision is to establish a rule which may 
be applied to prevent picketing for the purpose of publicizing the fact 
that an employer is discriminating against persons because of race or 
color in the selection of employees ... if the picketing is truthful and peace-
ful, it may be resorted to as the exercise of the constitutional right of 
freedom of speech or press, and that is all petitioners did in this case.30 
Comment 
Justice Carter's dissent in Hughes ultimately embodied more than an opin-
ion about the right to picket and the Free Speech implications of such actions. 
In truth, the actions taken by Hughes and his friends had been occurring in the 
Bay Area and in other parts of California before the beginning of the war.31 
Although the Hughes holding was upheld by the United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Carter no doubt would have argued that their ruling was due to the 
same misapplication of Marinship undertaken by his own California Supreme 
Court colleagues in the Hughes case.32 
The peaceful picketing in the 1940s described by Justice Carter in Hughes set 
the stage for the expanded use of both violent and non-violent picketing, 
protests and demonstrations in the 1960s, the beginning of the modern Civil 
Rights Movement. Further, it can be argued that some of the language used in 
his dissent could have been inserted into a brief extolling the benefits of mod-
ern day affirmative action. For example, Carter wrote in Hughes that: 
28. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 864 (Carter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
29. ld. at 864-65. 
30. ld. at 866-67. 
31. See ''Visions;' supra note 1. 
32. Justice Traynor's dissent also indicated that the majority had erroneously applied 
Marinship. See Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 867 (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
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It must be admitted by every thinking person that Negroes are, and 
have been, constantly discriminated against. They are considered by 
some as being fit only for the most menial positions. It was even found 
necessary for the Legislatures of the various states to pass laws that 
they might obtain shelter and food on an equal basis with members 
of the white race. The abolition of slavery did not free the Negro from 
the chains his color imposes on him. It has been said that Negroes 
may obtain equal opportunities with others for employment by or-
ganization, public meetings, propaganda, and by personal solicita-
tion. The effectiveness of these methods may well be doubted. Labor, 
as a whole, found that the only way it might attain its objectives of 
better working conditions, hours and pay was to exert economic pres-
sure on employers. Nothing else is heeded. Is the Negro here to be 
denied his only effective means of communicating to the public the facts 
in connection with the discrimination against him, and the only ef-
fective method by which he may achieve nondiscrimination? 
The majority assume, without deciding, that if racial discrimination 
exists, picketing in protest of it would not be for an unlawful objec-
tive. How can it be said that picketing to attain nondiscrimination is 
unlawful? Petitioners are asking equal treatment, that which is guar-
anteed to them by the Constitution of the United States, and yet their 
objective is called "unlawful." 
The end result of the majority decision is to establish a rule which 
may be applied to prevent picketing for the purpose of publicizing the 
fact that an employer is discriminating against persons because of race 
or color in the selection of his employees. Because, if such employer 
should employ only one of such race or color in some menial position, 
such as janitor or messenger boy, any claim of discrimination, ac-
cording to the majority view, would be unjustified, and picketing to 
prevent discrimination (even though thousands of qualified members 
of such race or color were refused employment for that reason) would 
be unlawful, and could be restrained by injunction. Thus must be the 
effect of the rule announced in the majority opinion.33 
This portion of Carter's dissent clearly recognizes the long history of dis-
crimination against blacks and the philosophy embodied in the majority's opin-
ion that effectively stifled blacks the opportunity to challenge long-held 
discriminatory hiring practices. Further, Justice Traynor's dissent, in which he 
33. Id. at 866-67. 
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endorsed a policy of "proportionate hiring" echoed some of the sentiments 
voiced by Justice Carter in his dissent and signaled an approach that would be 
used to fuel the proponents of the concept of affirmative action in the years to 
follow. 34 
Wholesale picketing, together with the bus and business boycotts of the 
1950s and 1960s, eventually led to nationwide school integration,35 the support 
of affirmative action advanced in President John F. Kennedy's 1963 Executive 
Order 10925,36 and the national policy forbidding job discrimination pursuant 
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,37 Along the way, the opinions ex-
pressed by Justice Carter in his Hughes dissent were taken up by many who be-
lieved that the road to the American Dream should be opened up for all. 
Accordingly, the language contained in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,38 
a Title VII case decided by the Supreme Court in 1979, could easily have been 
penned by Justice Carter himself: 
Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act-the inte-
gration of blacks into the mainstream of American society-could 
not be achieved unless this trend [black unemployment] were reversed. 
And Congress recognized that that would not be possible unless blacks 
were able to secure jobs "which have a future." As Senator Humphrey 
explained to the Senate: 
"What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant 
if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does it do him to be ac-
cepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his modest income? How 
can a Negro child be motivated to take full advantage of integrated 
education facilities if he has no hope of getting a job where he can use 
that education?" 
34. "The picketing in this case is directed at persuading Lucky to take action that it may 
lawfully take on its own initiative. No law prohibits Lucky from discriminating in favor or 
against Negroes. It may legally adopt a policy of proportionate hiring. The picketing confronts 
Lucky with the choice of adopting a policy that is not illegal in itself or risking the loss of 
patronage that may result from the picketing. Had California adopted a fair employment 
practices act that prohibited consideration of the race of applicants for jobs, it might be 
said that the demand for proportional hiring would be a demand that Lucky violate the 
law. Neither the Legislature nor the people have adopted such a statute, and I find no im-
plication in the majority opinion that its equivalent exists under the common law of this state." 
Hughes, 32 Cal. 2d at 869 (Traynor, }., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
35. Brown v. Bd. ofEdu., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
36. Executive Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (March 6, 1961). 
37. Title VII, CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, Pub. L. 88-352 (July 2, 1964). 
38. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 ( 1979). 
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"Without a job one cannot afford public convenience and accom-
modations. Income from employment may be necessary to further a 
man's education, or that of his children. If his children have no hope 
of getting a good job, what will motivate them to take advantage of ed-
ucational opportunities?" 
These remarks echoed President Kennedy's original message to 
Congress upon the introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1963.39 
It is well-documented today that there has been a steady nationwide back-
lash against affirmative action, evidenced by legislation like California's Propo-
sition 209, the efforts of affirmative action opponents Ward Connerly40 and 
the Center for Individual Rights, and in United States Supreme Court holdings 
such as Richmond v. ].A. Croson Companyn and Adarand Constructors v. Pena.42 
In the balance is the question whether there will be further erosion in the rights 
and protections that John Hughes and others fought for during World War II 
in Richmond, California. Despite the changing political landscape of the 21st 
century, it is doubtful that if he were alive today, Justice Carter would change 
his mind about the principled and straightforward views he expressed in Hughes. 
George Bernard Shaw once wrote, "all progress depends on the unreason-
able man."43 Justice Carter's judicial colleagues may often have thought that 
some of the opinions he expressed in dissents were intractable, stubborn and 
unreasonable, perhaps all three. Perhaps. But he was right. 
39. Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted). 
40. "Supporting segregation need not be racist. One can believe in segregation and be-
lieve in equality the races." Ward Connerly quoted by Bob Herbert, "Weirder and Weirder," 
NEw YoRK TIMES, December 19, 2002. 
41. Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989). 
42. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
43. George Bernard Shaw, "Man and Superman: Maxims for Revolutionists" (1903). 
